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Finders Weepers 
ROGER BERNHARDT 
 
Nothing better demonstrates the idiosyncrasies of the law of finders than the testimony quoted 
by the court in its recent decision in Lindenstadt v Staff Builders, Inc. (1997) 55 CA4th 882, 64 
CR2d 484. Lindenstadt claimed finder’s fees for several deals he had put together based on a 
finder’s fee agreement he had with Staff Builders. He submitted the claims to arbitration. Staff 
Builders argued that Lindenstadt, who did not have a real estate license, was barred from 
recovering any fees because California law prohibits an unlicensed person from collecting any 
compensation for transactions requiring a real estate license. Lindenstadt, however, was relying 
on the “finder’s exception” to the real estate licensing law. That rule allows compensation to a 
person who simply finds and introduces the parties, but who does not engage in any negotiations 
to close the deal; the finder instead leaves the negotiations to the parties themselves. 
On Lindenstadt’s first claim, which concerned a deal involving Comprehensive Services, the 
appellate court quoted the arbitrator as follows: 
“Lindenstadt testified that he obtained Comprehensive’s financial reports to forward to Staff 
Builders and also ‘facilitated meetings, kept discussions on track.’ Lindenstadt’s testimony as to 
his activities was vague and conclusory and the Arbitrator gave it little credence. . . . Staff 
Builders’ [president] Steve Savitsky testified that Lindenstadt had no involvement in negotiating 
terms of the Comprehensive Services deal. The Arbitrator makes the factual finding that Mr. 
Lindenstadt’s activities were as testified by Mr. Savitsky.” 
Thus, the effect of Lindenstadt’s lack of credibility was that the arbitrator concluded that his 
actions “included no prohibited ‘broker’ activities precluding enforcement of the contract. 
Therefore the fee agreement relating to Comprehensive Services is enforceable.” 
The same thing happened on a deal involving Homelife Nursing, Inc. The appellate court 
again quoted the arbitrator: 
“Mr. Lindenstadt testified that he spoke to Mr. Gleason [the potential seller] at least 5–10 
times over the course of 1993 to see how things were progressing and also discussed Homelife 
with Staff Builders several times asking whether they were pursuing the opportunity. . . . Mr. 
Gleason contradicted Mr. Lindenstadt, stating that he had never spoken to Lindenstadt and would 
recall 5–10 conversations if they had occurred. Mr. Gleason also testified that such conversations 
could not have occurred as he would not discuss acquisition matters with anyone, had no 
authority to do so, and would forward such calls to Homelife CEO Ed Schrum.” 
The arbitrator again disbelieved Lindenstadt’s testimony, stating: “The Arbitrator believed Mr. 
Gleason’s and Schrum’s testimony as to the nonexistence of these conversations as more 
credible than Mr. Lindenstadt’s.” The result of the arbitrator’s rejection of Lindenstadt’s 
testimony, however, was the same as in the Comprehensive deal: “Therefore, there is no factual 
basis for finding that Mr. Lindenstadt engaged in prohibited brokering activities. The contract 
with respect to Homelife is enforceable.” 
Lindenstadt ought to thank his lucky stars that he was such a poor witness. Had the arbitrator 
believed him, she would have had to conclude that he had acted like a broker rather than a finder 
and thus deny him—because he held no real estate broker’s license—his commission. 
Shooting Yourself in the Foot 
I can understand why Lindenstadt, being neither a lawyer nor a broker, would be motivated to 
testify as he did: It is a natural human sentiment to believe, when you are claiming 
compensation, that you ought to show how hard you worked. But where was his lawyer—or the 
defendant’s lawyers—when he was putting on his case? Both sides said on the stand exactly the 
opposite of what was in their best interests. 
As noted above, Lindenstadt could recover a finder’s fee only if his activities were limited to 
finding; to do more would be to act like a real estate broker but without a license. As the court 
stated (55 CA4th at 894): 
[T]he purpose of the broker’s licensing statute—the promotion of competency and trust—is not 
served by denying Lindenstadt a finder’s fee on transactions where he merely introduced the 
principals to one another, and Staff Builders thereafter negotiated the acquisition. The goal of the 
licensing law is adequately served by denying Lindenstadt any compensation on those 
transactions where he crossed the line from finder to broker. 
Under a rule like this, one would expect to see Lindenstadt declaring how little he did, and the 
defendants praising Lindenstadt for his extensive involvement in the deal. 
It is an odd rule which motivates both sides to testify against their human intuitions. The 
supreme court has characterized it as a seeming anomaly, but has justified it as the unavoidable 
result of wanting, on the one hand, to require licensing for people who negotiate real estate and 
business deals while, on the other hand, wanting to enforce promises to pay persons who locate 
buyers or sellers for others. 
Indeed, there seems to be no universal common sense of finders’ rules. In California, we do 
not require the finder to be licensed, but we do require the finder to get a written agreement. See 
Tenzer v Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 C3d 18, 216 CR 130. Other states interpret their licensing 
statutes as covering finders, although some, at the same time, do not require a writing to enforce 
the fee agreement, which is just the opposite of what we do. See, e.g., Scott/Hubbard Co. v Sika 
Chem. Corp. (ND Ill 1988) 694 F Supp 1311. In New York, finders’ agreements have to be 
written, but brokers’ agreements do not, whereas California, until a few years ago, was just the 
opposite. 
Protecting Your Finder 
Whether the worry is the licensing statute or the statute of frauds, finders have to watch 
themselves. A written agreement should be executed in advance (as in Lindenstadt), and if you 
are the finder’s attorney you ought to ensure that the agreement contains language limiting the 
activities the finder should be expected to undertake. The agreement probably also should 
provide that the finder will not in any way participate in the negotiations between the parties. 
Even if you are lucky enough to get all those nice clauses in the contract, however, the parties 
may forget about them entirely once a deal starts to materialize. Consider this paragraph from a 
1990 District of Columbia opinion: 
After Kaempfer rejected Yazbeck’s initial offer for the Hotel and office building, Kassatly [the 
finder] personally contacted Kaempfer about the deal on Yazbeck’s behalf. KASSATLY: He 
[Yazbeck] says, “Kassatly, I want you to go to see Kaempfer immediately and tell him that I 
don’t agree with this and we still need to negotiate and I still am interested in buying the hotel.” 
QUESTION: Did you do that? ANSWER: Yes absolutely. 
The court’s conclusion was that “[p]laintiff’s deposition testimony demonstrates that plaintiff did 
much more than simply introduce the parties.” Kassatly v Yazbeck (DDC 1990) 734 F Supp 13. 
Finders are legally expected merely to introduce the parties but, because they get no 
commission unless and until a deal is consummated, can we really expect them to take no 
interest in what happens after the introduction or to reject requests for help from the principals? 
At such a preliminary stage, to honor the legal imperative and stay out of the negotiations is 
probably to blow the deal. We may give that advice, but we should not be surprised if the client 
does not follow it. Isn’t there anything more sensible to suggest? 
Minimizing the Extra Effort 
An old case, Freeman v Jergins (1954) 125 CA2d 536, 271 P2d 210, might be helpful. In that 
case the finder went too far, but still won. The court stated (125 CA2d at 546): 
[P]laintiff had done everything that he was required to do when he brought about the 
introduction of Lee. That constituted performance on his part, and it is that performance and 
nothing else for which he seeks compensation. If he did more than that it was not in performance 
of anything that he had undertaken to do or was required to do in order to earn his compensation. 
He is not suing for compensation earned as a result of his efforts in effecting a sale, but claims it 
solely on the basis of his introduction of Lee and the results of the efforts of Smith-Barney. Even 
if he had engaged in some activity that was not required of him, and which was wholly apart 
from the full performance of his agreement, this would not be a defense against liability of the 
defendants to him for the full performance of a valid agreement in a lawful manner. 
If the Freeman logic really works, it suggests how attorneys can be helpful. The original 
agreement can provide that any services over and above the initial introduction are not part of the 
finder’s basic contractual obligations and are gratuitous rather than for compensation. Even if 
that language is not in the contract, we can draft letters for the finder to send reciting that he or 
she has been asked to (and will) perform some additional services, but that these should be 
treated as extracontractual courtesies. The letter could also state that the services are not to be 
deemed to constitute “negotiations,” because all parties appreciate that the finder is not licensed 
and could not lawfully render such services even if desired to do so. 
By the way, you also have the same problems when you are acting as a finder rather than as an 
attorney for the finder. Your state bar license is no substitute for a broker’s license, so you can’t 
claim a broker’s commission if you go beyond strict finding. See Provisor v Haas Realty, Inc. 
(1967) 256 CA2d 850, 64 CR 509. Holding a broker’s license in addition to a bar card will let 
you collect either an attorney fee or a broker’s commission; trying to get both in the same deal 
can cause serious problems, because you must comply with both sets of (often inconsistent) 
professional standards at the same time. See California State Bar Formal Opinion No. 82–69. 
 
